AirBorne: Zero-Click Worms in Your Living Room

In April 2025, researchers at Oligo Security disclosed something that made every Apple device owner reconsider their network trust model: 23 vulnerabilities in Apple’s AirPlay protocol, collectively dubbed “AirBorne.” The most critical of these allow zero-click, wormable remote code execution — meaning an attacker on your network can compromise your MacBook, then your HomePod, then your TV, then every AirPlay device on every network those devices subsequently connect to.

No user interaction required. No click. No prompt. No notification.

The Protocol

AirPlay is Apple’s proprietary protocol for wireless streaming of audio, video, and screen mirroring between devices. It’s been a core feature of the Apple ecosystem since 2010 and is embedded in:

• Every Mac, iPhone, iPad, Apple TV, and HomePod
• Hundreds of third-party speakers, receivers, TVs, and car infotainment systems via the AirPlay SDK
• CarPlay-equipped vehicles

The protocol operates over WiFi using a combination of mDNS for service discovery, HTTP/RTSP for session negotiation, and custom encryption for media streaming. Devices advertise themselves on the local network and accept connections based on configurable access control.

The Vulnerabilities

Of the 23 vulnerabilities Oligo reported, Apple assigned 17 CVEs. The three most critical:

CVE-2025-24252: Use-After-Free (CVSS 9.8)

A use-after-free vulnerability in macOS’s AirPlay service. When the service handles malformed network packets, a memory object is freed but a dangling pointer remains. The attacker triggers use of this pointer to achieve arbitrary code execution.

This is the wormable vulnerability. Combined with CVE-2025-24206, it enables zero-click propagation across devices.

CVE-2025-24206: Authentication Bypass (CVSS 7.7)

An authentication bypass that eliminates the user interaction requirement. AirPlay receivers have a configuration setting: “Allow AirPlay for” with options like “Current User,” “Anyone on the Same Network,” or “Everyone.” CVE-2025-24206 bypasses the “Accept” click that normally appears even on permissive configurations.

This is the zero-click enabler. Without it, CVE-2025-24252 requires the victim to accept an AirPlay connection. With it, the exploit is fully automated.

CVE-2025-24132: Stack Buffer Overflow (CVSS 6.5)

A stack-based buffer overflow in the AirPlay SDK — the library Apple provides to third-party manufacturers. This vulnerability achieves zero-click RCE on speakers, receivers, and other third-party devices under all configurations, regardless of access control settings.

WARN

CVE-2025-24132 affects third-party devices running the AirPlay SDK. Apple can patch its own devices, but SDK-dependent hardware relies on individual manufacturers to push firmware updates. Many will never be patched.

The Worm Scenario

Here’s what makes AirBorne existential: the exploit is wormable. Consider this attack chain:

1. Attacker compromises MacBook on coffee shop WiFi
   └→ CVE-2025-24252 + CVE-2025-24206 (zero-click RCE)

2. Victim carries MacBook to corporate office
   └→ Connects to corporate WiFi

3. Compromised MacBook propagates to office AirPlay devices
   └→ Conference room Apple TV, HomePod in the lobby

4. Compromised Apple TV propagates to other devices on network
   └→ Other MacBooks, iPhones with AirPlay Receiver enabled

5. Those devices move to other networks
   └→ Home networks, other offices, hotels

6. Propagation continues indefinitely

No lateral movement tools needed. No second-stage payload. The worm uses AirPlay’s own service discovery to find new targets and the same vulnerability chain to compromise them. The attack propagates silently, leaving no visible indication on the victim’s device.

HACK

The default macOS configuration has AirPlay Receiver enabled and set to “Current User” — which, combined with the ACL bypass vulnerabilities, still presents exploitable attack surface. Changing to a more restrictive setting reduces but doesn’t eliminate the risk.

The Third-Party Problem

Apple patched its own devices on March 31, 2025:

• iOS / iPadOS 18.4
• macOS Ventura 13.7.5, Sonoma 14.7.5, Sequoia 15.4
• visionOS 2.4

The AirPlay SDK patches were released to the MFi (Made for iPhone/iPad) Program:

• AirPlay audio SDK 2.7.1 (March 31, 2025)
• AirPlay video SDK 3.6.0.126 (March 31, 2025)
• CarPlay Communication Plug-in R18.1 (April 4, 2025)

But here’s the problem: the MFi ecosystem includes hundreds of manufacturers producing speakers, receivers, TVs, set-top boxes, and car infotainment systems. Each manufacturer must independently integrate the patched SDK and push firmware updates to their devices.

How many Sonos speakers, Bose receivers, and Samsung TVs will actually receive the update? How many hotel room Apple TVs? How many rental car CarPlay systems?

The honest answer: a fraction. Consumer electronics have notoriously poor patch lifecycles. Many AirPlay SDK devices will remain vulnerable for their entire operational lifetime.

Responsible Disclosure Timeline

Date	Event
Late 2024	Oligo begins AirPlay protocol research
Early 2025	23 vulnerabilities identified and reported to Apple
March 31, 2025	Apple releases patches for iOS, macOS, visionOS, and SDK
April 4, 2025	CarPlay plug-in patch released
April 28, 2025	Apple pushes additional fixes via Rapid Security Response
April 29, 2025	Oligo publishes AirBorne research

Mitigation

If you’re reading this, here’s what you should do right now:

For Apple devices:

Settings → General → Software Update → Install latest version

For AirPlay configuration:

Mac: System Settings → General → AirDrop & Handoff → AirPlay Receiver → Off
     (or set "Allow AirPlay for" to "Current User" at minimum)

iPhone/iPad: Settings → General → AirPlay & Continuity → AirPlay Receiver → Off

For network administrators:

• Block AirPlay traffic (TCP/UDP port 7000) between untrusted network segments
• Isolate IoT and AV devices on separate VLANs
• Audit third-party AirPlay devices and contact manufacturers for firmware updates
• Consider disabling AirPlay on managed devices via MDM

For third-party device owners:

• Check manufacturer websites for firmware updates
• If no update is available, isolate the device on a dedicated IoT network
• Consider whether the device needs to be network-connected at all

INFO

If you can’t patch a third-party AirPlay device, network segmentation is your best defense. An unpatched speaker on an isolated VLAN can’t be used as a pivot point even if it’s compromised.

The Bigger Picture

AirBorne demonstrates a pattern we see repeatedly in IoT security: a protocol designed for convenience is implemented without adversarial threat modeling, embedded in billions of devices via an SDK, and then found to be fundamentally broken.

Apple responded quickly and patched their own ecosystem. But the SDK devices — the speakers, the TVs, the car systems — exist in a firmware update wasteland where patches arrive late, if ever. The attack surface isn’t just Apple’s to manage.

23 vulnerabilities. 17 CVEs. Billions of devices. Zero clicks required.

Your living room is listening. Make sure it’s patched.

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If your AirPlay receiver is on, turn it off. Then update. Then turn it back on if you actually need it.

-- rf_ghost